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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

*************
FASHIONS FOUR CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation and
ELGIN WILLIAMS,

)
)
)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,)
)
-vs)
)
FASHION PLACE ASSOCIATES,
)
a limited partnership,
)
and BOB GARWOOD,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant. )

Case No. 18164

************
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

************
NATURE OF THE CASE
This action arises out of a dispute regarding the
interpretation of a written lease agreement, and the
parties' respective rights thereunder.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court found that under a lease agreement Plaintiff was entitled to possession of the
premises in dispute.

The lower Court awarded Plain-

tiff a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendant from
interfering with Plaintiff's possession of the premises,
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money damages, and an award of attorney's fees.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-appellant seeks reversal of the trial
court judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, an entry of
judgment in favor of Defendant on Defendant's Counterclaim, and the action to be remanded to the lower court
for a determination of the amount of damages sustained
by Defendant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Fashion Place Associates, the Defendant-appellant
(hereinafter Fashion Place) is the lessor of the Fashion
Place Mall which is situated in the County of Salt Lake,
State of Utah.

The corporate Plaintiff-respondent,

Fashions Four Corporation (hereinafter Fashions Four) was
the lessee of certain commercial premises at the
Fashion Place Mall under a written lease agreement
dated May 6, 1974.

(R. 8).

From 1974 through September of 1978 Fashions
Four operated a connnercial women's ready-to-wear store
under the trade name

11

Clrnrlie' s" in the leased premises .

. 2.
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(T. 28)

In September 1978 Fashions Four sold that

business to Norsal Development Corporation (hereinafter Norsal), subject to Fashion Place Associates'
approval of the assignment of the lease to Norsal.
(T. 32)

Article 15 of the written lease agreement

required the lessor's consent for any assignment or
transfer of the lease.

(R. 20)

Fashion Place Associates consented to the
assignment of the lease to Norsal and a written
assignment was prepared by

~ashion

Place reflecting

that consent, as well as the agreement of Fashions
Four as assignor and Norsal as assignee to be bound
by the terms of the lease agreement, with specific
reference to the "consent to assignment" provisions
of the original lease agreement.

(T. 31, R. 60, 61)

The written assignment was circulated for signature.
assignor.

(T. 32)

It was signed by Fashions Four as

(T. 32, R. 61)

However, the original

document was apparently lost in transit and was not
signed by either Fashion Place Associates or Norsal.
(R. 61) Despite the failure to complete the execution
process, Fashion Place Associates, Fashions Four
Corporation, and Norsal all respected the assignment,
and no challenge was raised to Norsal's right to

. 3.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

possession of the premises.

(R. 72)

In November of 1979, without the knowledge of
Fashion Place Associates, all the stock of Norsal was
conveyed to Neil Davidson, who prior to that time had
been a minor shareholder of the corporation.

(T. 93)

The business known as "Charlie's was. the sole asset
of Norsal. (T. 93)
"Charlie's" under Neil Davidson and Norsal was
not a profitable operation.

(T. 100)

On a number

of occasions rent was not paid in a timely fashion.
(T. 100)

Between October 1980 and June of 1981, three

separate actions were initiated by the lessor Fashion
Place Associates seeking rental arrearages and/or
recovery of the premises.

(T. 110, 115, 127)

By early June of 1981, the inventory of "Charlie's"
had been attached by judgment creditors and a sheriff's
sale of the inventory had been scheduled.

(T. 43)

On June 10, 1981, Norsal and Neil Davidson agreed
to assign the lease back to Fashions Four Corporation.
(T. 99)

On June 11, 1981, Neil Davidson on behalf of

Norsal signed two documents prepared by Elgin Williams
on behalf of Fashions Four Corporation, a repossession
agreement

(R. 149), and an assignment of lease.

(R. 150)

Fashion Place Associates had no knowledge of this agreement.

(T. 155)

Apparently the keys to the premises
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were delivered to Elgin Williams for Fashions Four
Corporation on June 11.

(T. 90)

However, the

store remained closed.
On or about June 19, 1981, after consultation
with counsel, Fashion Place Associates put its own
lock on the premises on the grounds that the store had
been closed for more than 15 days and that Norsal had
failed to pay any rent for several months, including
the June rental payment.

Norsal had not notified

Fashion Place Associates that it intended to be absent
from the premises, and except for the personal property
in the premises, there was no evidence that Norsal
was occupying the premises.

(T. 165)

The conditions

mandated by statute for a presumption of abandonment
entitling a lessor to re-enter lease premises appeared
to have been met.

Section 78-36-12.3(3), U.C.A. (1953,

as amended) .
On June 18, 1982, Mr. Williams on behalf of
Fashions Four returned to "Charlie'sn for the first
time since June 11 and allegedly discovered the Fashion
Place lock on the premises.

(T. 44)

On June 19, 1982

Mr. Williams met with the managers of the Fashion Place
Mall, Tom Estes and Bob Garwood.

(T. 45)

Mr. Williams

told them that he wanted to operate "Charlie's"

. 5.
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and that he had retaken possession of the premises
from Norsal.

(T. 46, 47)

Mr. Estes responded by

saying that Fashions Four could not retake possession
because the store had been abandoned by Norsal and
that the lessor had possession of the premises.

(T.46)

The managers also indicated that Fashions Four could
not take possession of the premises without the Lessor's
consent under the written lease agreement.

(T. 47)

Thereafter Fashion Place Associates continued to deny
that Fashions Four had a right to possession of the
premises.
The instant action was filed more than a month
later on July 23, 1982.

(R. 2)

On that same day,

the lower court issued a temporary restraining order
directing that Fashions Four be put in possession of
the premises.

(R. 39)

Fashion Place Associates com-

plied with the Court order putting Fashions Four in
possession no later than July 31, 1981.

(T. 72)

On or about August 1, 1981, Fashions Four
Corporation finalized their purchase of the attached
inventory which allowed Fashions Four to begin operating
the store.

(T. 72)

. 6.
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The lessor Fashion Place Associates counterclaimed asserting that the temporary restraining
order had been wrongfully issued and that Fashions Four
could not have any possessory interest in the premises
without the lessor's consent.

(R. 55)

Trial was held on October 6 and 7, 1981 before
the Honorable Jay E. Banks.

On October 23, 1981 the

lower court by minute order found for the Plaintiff
Fashions Four Corporation against the Defendant
Fashion Place Associates.

(R. 180)

Fashions Four

Corporation was awarded a permanent injunction prohibiting Fashion Place Associates from interfering
with Fashions Four's possession of the premises, general
damages in the amount of $3,500, and $7,000 in attorney's
fees.

(R. 207)
Findings of fact and conclusions of law, judgment

and pennanent injunction were duly entered by the Court
on November 24, 1981.

(R. 208)

The trial court entered an order on December 7, 1981
denying Fashion Place Associates' motion for amendment
of the judgment or a new trial.

(R. 216)

Defendant's

notice of appeal was filed on January 5, 1982. (R. 222)

. 7.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
AS A MATTER OF·LAW THE JUNE 11, "ASSIGNMENT
BACK" OF THE LEASE DID NOT TRANSFER ANY
INTEREST IN THE LEASE TO FASHIONS FOUR
CORPORATION BECAUSE THE CONSENT OF THE
LESSOR FASHION PLACE ASSOCIATES WAS NOT
OBTAINED AS REQUIRED BY THE LEASE AGREEMENT.
On June 11, 1981 as judgment creditors of
Norsal and Neil Davidson were arranging the liquidation
of the "Charlie's" inventory, Norsal and Neil Davidson
attempted to assign the lease "back" to the original
tenant, Fashions Four Corporation.

Fashions Four

Corporation's claim to any interest in the lease stands
or falls on the validity of that June 11 transfer.
It is undisputed that the lease agreement which
Norsal was attempting to assign to Fashions Four
Corporation provides in clear

and unambiguous language

that no interest can be transfered without the lessor's
written consent.

(R. 20)

It is also undisputed that the

June 11 conveyance from Norsal to Fashions Four Corporation was made without the lessor's consent.

Despite

the failure of Norsal and/or Fashions Four Corporation to
obtain the lessor's consent, the trial court found that
the June 11 transfer was effective.

(R. 204)

From the

. 8.
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standpoint of well-established contract law, as well
as public policy, that finding was erroneous.
Modern connnercial leases, particularly those
involving enclosed shopping malls, tend to be both
long and complex.

By way of example, the body of the

lease involved in the instant action is 31 pages in
length and contains 35 separate articles.

The parties

to such leases are sophisticated participants in the
commercial arena.

The leases adopted by such parties

attempt to address in detail every possible question
or potential problem that could arise between the
lessor and the lessee.

Specific references to the

circumstances under which assignment or conveyance
of the lease will be allowed are standard.
Assignment or transfer of a lease interest by a
tenant is critically important to the lessor of an
enclosed shopping mall.

The lessor has connnonly made

contractual promises to other mall tenants regarding the
kinds of tenants that will be allowed to lease space.
By controlling the tenant mix, the lessor seeks to
optimize retail opportunities for all mall ·tenants.
Without that control, the lessor loses its ability to
meet its contractual obligations to specific tenants,
and its abil.i ty to optimize the connnercial environment

. 9.
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for all tenants.

A lessor without the power to pass

muster on a particular tenant may be faced with a
poorly operated store that will hurt the business of
all the adjoining tenants.
The "consent to assignment" provisions of the
standard retail lease play an essential role in protecting the interests of other tenants as well as the
interests of the lessor.

The "consent to assignment"

provisions are contractual in nature and are intended
to express a "meeting of the minds" of the leasing
parties as regards the circumstances under which
assignment, subletting, or any other conveyance or
transfer will be allowed.
A lease is a contract.

Zeese vs. Estate of

Siegel, 535 P.2d 85 (Utah, 1975).

A written contract

duly entered into should be regarded with some sanctity,
and its connnitments can only be overcome by clear and
convincing evidence.
(Utah, 1978).

Otteson vs. Malone, 584 P.2d 878

Parties are free to contract according

to their desires in whatever terms they can agree
upon.

The contract should be enforced according to

its terms unless the result is so unconscionable that
a court of equity will refuse to enforce it.

Russell

vs. Park City Utah Corporation, 548 P.2d 889 (Utah, 1976) .

. 10.
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Despite these basic principles of contract law,
the trial court refused to enforce the "consent to
assignment" provisions of the lease agreement, and
instead recognized the validity of the June 11 assignment from Norsal to Fashions Four Corporation, regardless
of the fact that Fashion Place Associates did not consent
to the transfer.
The rationale of the trial court in arriving
at that decision is apparently based on a rule
announced in Coulos vs. Desimone, 208 P.2d 105, (Wash.
1949), which follows an even older case, McCormick vs.
Stowell, 138 Mass. 431, (Mass. 1885).

These two cases

adopt the rule that there exists a single hidden
exception to the "consent to assignment" provisions
of written lease agreements.

It is the holding of

these cases that despite specific language in a lease
that assignment is prohibited without written consent
of the lessor, an assignee may always assign back to the
original tenant without the consent of the lessor.
Following that principle, the trial court found that
the consent of Fashion Place Associates to the June
11 assignment back to Fashions Four Corporation was
not required.

.11.
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The only rationale for this hidden exception to
specific contract language offered by the Massachusetts
case is that the lessor has consented to take the
original lessee as his tenant for the full term
mentioned in the lease.

That consent remains available

for any reassignment to the original lease during the
tenn.

The 1949 Washington case adopts that language

without any analysis whatsoever.
Because this is an issue of first impression in
Utah, this Court should carefully consider the wisdom
of adopting the Massachusetts position.

The following

considerations are important.
The "consent to assignment" provisions of
modern leases have two purposes.

First, they are intended

to reject by contract the common law rule that leaseholds
are freely

assig~able.

Second, and perhaps more impor-

tantly, such provisions are designed to insure that the
lessor has a responsible tenant to look to for performance of the lease.

Adoption of the Massachusetts

rule would make the attainment of these two goals
impossible.
A modern commercial lessor has no guarantee,
and no reason to expect, that a responsible corporate

.12.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tenant will still be responsible eight years after the
execution of a 10 year lease.

Assume the original

corporate tenant, ABC Inc., assigns a lease after
three years to XYZ Corporation.

XYZ performs for five

years and then wants to assign back to ABC Inc.

ABC

by that point may well have new officers, new shareholders, perhaps an entirely different business.

Does

the fact that the corporation was a responsible
tenant eight years before have any bearing or relevance
whatsoever to its current qualifications?
The straightforwardanswer to that question is
no.

For all practical purposes, from the lessor's

perspective, the original corporate tenant is no
different than any other potential tenant.

If the

lessor's contractual right to a responsible tenant
is to be protected, it must have an opportunity to
pass on the qualifications of all potential tenants,
including those of an original corporate tenant.
The rule announced in the Massachusetts case in
1885 may well have made sense under the commercial
conditions existing at the time, when the corporate
form of business activity was less common than at present.
It is equally clear that the adoption of this 19th
century principle would not serve the needs of modern
commerce.

Given the opportunity, this Court should
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reject the adoption of a rule that has the effect of
writing a hidden exception into the clear and unambiguous
language agreed to by both parties to the lease contract.
Instead this Court should enforce the lease
contract as it was written by the contracting
parties, and refuse to recognize

th~

June 11 "assign-

ment back" to Fashions Four Corporation from Norsal
on the ground that Fashion Place Associates' consent
was not obtained to that transfer.

POINT II
THE "CONSENT TO ASSIGNMENT" PROVISIONS
OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT ARE APPLICABLE
TO THE JUNE 11 "ASSIGNMENT BACK" FROM
NORSAL TO FASHIONS FOUR CORPORATION.
It is undisputed that Fashions Four Corporation's
alleged possession of the lease premises arose from
the June 11 "assignment back" of the lease from
Norsal to Fashions Four Corporation.

(R. 202)

At

trial, Fashions Four Corporation argued that Fashion
Place Associates' consent to that transfer was not
required under the Massachusetts rule described in
Point I (supra).

Fashions Four Corporation also

contended that the consent provisions of the lease
agreement were waived because Fashion Place Associates
had not signed a written consent to the original
1978 assignment from Fashions Four Corporation
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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to Norsal.

That proposition is

defective~

as a matter

of both law and logic.
Throughout the trial court proceedings, Fashion
Place Associates acknowledged that it had in fact
consented to the 1978 assignment from Fashions
Four Corporation to Norsal.

The trial court in

fact found that Fashion Place Associates had
consented to that assignment.
of Fact No. 9)

(R. 200, Finding

Fashion Place Associates has

no dispute with that finding.

How then can Fashions

Four Corporation contend that Fashion Place Associates
by its conduct at the time of the original assignment
waived the application of the consent provisions?
Waiver would have to be based on a finding
that Fashion Place Associates failed to enforce
the consent provisions at the time of the 1978
assignment.

The finding of the lower court is

directly to the contrary.

(R. 200)

Clearly, because

the ''consent provision" was not waived in 1978 it
remained applicable at the time of the attempted
transfer of June 11, 1981.
However, for the purposes of argument only,
assume that the consent provisions were waived at the
time of the original assignment in 1978.

.15.

Would such
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a waiver have resulted in a waiver at the time of the
second assignment?

The answer to that question is

found in the last paragraph of Article 22 of
the lease agreement (R. 30), which reads:
"The waiver by landlord of any 5reach
of any term, covenant or condition
herein contained shall not be deemed
to be a waiver of such term; covenant
or condition or any subsequent breach
of the same or any other term, covenant
or condition herein contained. The
subsequent acceptance of rent hereunder
by landlord shall not be deemed to
be a waiver of any preceeding breach
by tenant of any term, covenant or
condition of this lease, other than
the failure of tenant to pay the
particular rental so accepted, regardless of landlord's knowledge of such
preceeding breach at the time of
acceptance of such rent.
No covenant,
term, or condition of this lease shall
be deemed to have been waived by
landlord unless such waiver be in
writing by landlord." (R. 30) (Emphasis
added).
Obviously, even if waiver occurred in 1978,
under the express language of the contract, there would
be no resulting waiver in 1981.

In Nashville Record

Prod. vs. Mr. Transmission, Tenn. App., 523 S.W.2d 281
(1981) a similar "no subsequent waiver" provision was
found controlling where a defaulting tenant attempted
to claim that a custom of accepting late payments waived
the right of the lessor to demand timely payment .

r
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Fashions Four Corporation's waiver contention is
thus doubly defective.

First, the exercise of the

right to consent simply will not result in a waiver
of that provision.

Secondly, a single waiver of the

consent provision, even assuming one occurred, would
not result in the waiver of that provision in the
future under the clear language of the contract.

CONCLUSION
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN SUBSTITUTING
ITS OWN VERSION OF THE LEASE IN PLACE
OF THE CLEAR AND SPECIFIC LANGUAGE
OF THE WRITTEN CONTRACT.
The trial court, in refusing to enforce the
"no assignment without consent" provisions of the
lease substituted its own version of the contract
in place of the clear and specific language agreed
to by both parties.

That substitution is damaging

in two respects.
Modern courts recognize the right of individuals
to contract "according to their desires," and generally
hold that contracts should be enforced according to
their terms unless the result is unconscionable.
Russell vs. Park City Utah Corporation

(supra).

The

decision of the lower court to substitute its own
version of the lease, a version that inserts a hidden
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exception to the clear language of the document, weakens
the rights of contracting parties generally to conduct
their connnercial affairs as they see fit.
More specifically, the adoption by this Court
of the Massachusetts rule, that reassignment to an
original tenant does not require a lessor's consent
despite express language to the contrary, jeopardizes
the ability of lessors to meet their contractual
obligations to other tenants, and reduces the lessor's
ability to optimize the commercial environment for all
tenants.

The critical importance of tenant "mix" in

shopping malls has been judicially recognized.

Warmack

vs. Merchant's Nat. Bank of Fort Smith, 612 S.W.2d 733
(Ark. 1981).
The waiver argtnnents raised by Fashions Four
Corporation are totally without merit.

The exercise

of the right to consent by Fashion Place Associates
in 1978 as regards the original assignment from Fashions
Four Corporation to Norsal simply does not result in the
waiver of that same right as regards the 1981 "assignment back" to Fashions Four Corporation.

Assuming

arguendo that the right was waived in 1978, the clear
language of the contract prohibits any such waiver from
applying to a future breach .

. 18.
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Fashion Place Associates has been wrongfully
deprived of its right of possession of the lease
premises since at least July 31, 1981.

In the

interest of justice, the lower court's ruling should
be reversed, and the case remanded to the trial court
with instructions to dismiss Fashions Four Corporation's
Complaint and to enter judgment in favor of Fashron
Place Associates on its Counterclaim, with further
proceedings to be held on the amount of damages sustained by Fashion Place Associates.
compensate

Fash~on

Such action would

Place Associates for the damage

it has been forced to sustain, and reaffirm this
Court's commitment to the rights of contract.

DATED this

~

day of

~

, 1982.

Respectfully submitted,
GREEN, HIGGINS & BERRY

R'
o
Scott Berry
Attorney for Defendant-
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